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PUBLIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES:  
EVIDENCE FROM THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the role of public corporate governance in the restructuring of the Spanish 
financial sector. State-owned savings banks or Cajas provide evidence of the conflict of 
interest in multilevel governance. We find that choice of the integration mechanism 
(merger, IPS or acquisition) can be explained by two drivers: geographical and political 
proximity.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the current economic crisis, the Spanish banking system has been under stress, and 
savings banks or Cajas, in particular, which have a strong public status, have been going 
through a major reorganization. Cajas carry significant weight in the banking sector since 
they represent half of the market share for loans and deposits and, for the last decade, they 
have experienced strong growth. However, they have also accumulated a high percentage 
of loans to the Spanish real estate industry and, therefore, suffer tougher problems of 
solvency than the private banking sector. This lack of solvency has triggered a process of 
integration that highlights both the public nature of Cajas and the conflict of interest 
between the regional and national government levels. Thus, the objective of this paper is to 
examine the drivers behind each integration and, more specifically, to study how the 
tension between the different levels of government is shaping the reorganization. 
Cajas share a public status common to other non-private savings sectors in many 
European countries such as  Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Russia (ESBG, 2009). 
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They share a similar origin (founded by local or regional governments, churches, welfare 
societies and trade unions) and common goals to promote savings and provide lending to 
businesses and individuals in the region. This array of goals, which encompasses social and 
economic development, is one of the main features of Cajas. In addition, Cajas have an 
ownership structure involving various stakeholders: depositors (savers), local and regional 
governments, founders and employees. Moreover, national and regional regulation has 
translated this stakeholder ownership structure into different representative structures in the 
governing bodies of individual Cajas. That is, the legislator has determined the power of 
the governments and decision-making authorities in these institutions: both the general 
assembly and the board of directors have substantial representation of local and regional 
Governments (up to a maximum of 50% of voting rights until July 2010, and from then 
onwards up to 40%). Within this governance framework, the need to reorganize the sector 
and find new efficiencies across Cajas has required the public sector to play an important 
role at several different levels: this is public corporate governance.  
In Section II we present an overview of the Spanish state-owned banks and its 
governance characteristics that sets them apart from private banks. Section III presents the 
multi-level governance structure of Cajas and in section IV and V we examine the drivers 
behind the reorganization of the Spanish banking system.   
 
II. CAJAS IN THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY  
As in many European countries, the Spanish banking system has two very distinct type of 
institutions: private banks and public savings banks. The Spanish savings banks or Cajas 
constitute an important network that have been increasingly competing with private 
banking institutions since the liberalization of the Spanish banking system in 1977 (see 
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Figure 1 and González et. al., 2011). Cajas are credit entities with a strong commitment to 
promoting savings; they focus on the development of domestic economies and small 
businesses by providing an extensive network of offices; and they retain an important role 
in financing regional economies. A trait of these savings institutions is that they are 
required to distribute part of their benefits in social and cultural projects. These so-called 
“social dividends” reflect the not-for-profit nature of Cajas, which may often conflict with 
value maximization goals (Illueca et al., 2009). As García-Cestona and Surroca (2008: 583) 
indicate: “Spanish savings banks pursue, by law, a wide set of goals. Furthermore, given 
the absence of shareholders, making a profit becomes only one among several measures of 
success.”  
Another important characteristic of these Cajas concerns their links with both local 
governments and autonomous communities -regional governments- (their regulation itself 
advocates this). Local and regional governments are part of the governance structure up to a 
50% as founding entities and, at the same time, regional governments are the regulators of 
Cajas inside their territories. The result is that “Cajas are an unusual segment of the 
Spanish financial sector, characterized by heavy political involvement; as a result, moves 
towards changing the regulation of the segment are continuously being discussed.” (Cuñat 
& Garricano, 2009: 2).  
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Figure 1. Comparison of Cajas and bank percentages in terms of the total Spanish 
banking system—in assets
 
 
Source: Constructed using data from the Bulletin of the Bank of Spain (www.bde.es)1 
 
Cajas are radically different from the private Spanish banking system; two striking 
institutional features set them apart. First, Cajas cannot raise capital by issuing shares. This 
limitation has forced Cajas to grow either by using debt to access capital or by merging 
with other institutions. In this respect, there is asymmetric competition with the private 
banking sector: while Cajas can acquire privately owned banks, their ownership structure 
means that banks cannot acquire Cajas. Moreover, Cajas are not quoted in the stock 
market. The fact that Cajas are completely isolated from the market of corporate control 
eliminates an important source of discipline for its managers. In contrast with other banks, 
                                           
1 http://www.bde.es/webbde/es/estadis/infoest/a04a.pdf [Accessed 17th March 2011]. 
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Cajas are not susceptible to takeover if they underperform. Second, instead of shareholders 
Cajas have a complex system of stakeholders that includes the founding entities, the 
regional government, municipal corporations and their employees, among others. Thus, 
they do not represent only the organization’s owners, as shareholders do; they represent the 
organization’s environment.  
Given the lack of shares, the distribution of voting rights within the governing 
bodies is determined by law. Cajas have three main sources of regulation: the national 
government –which regulates the minimum common framework for Cajas in Spain—, the 
Bank of Spain (central bank), and the regional governments, which have the power to 
regulate the management of Cajas established in their regions. Thus, Cajas have three 
main governing bodies defined by national legislation: the general assembly, the board of 
directors and the control commission. In addition, regional regulations have established 
different stakeholder categories and their corresponding voting rights in the general 
assembly, the senior governing body. The distribution of representation follows 
(minimum-maximum %): public sector organizations 50%, depositors 25–50%, founding 
bodies 5-35%, employees 5–15%, and other (business organizations, universities, etc.) 
maximum 10%. The size of the general assembly varies between 60 and 160 members, 
depending on the institution.  
Next, the board oversees management and defines the strategy of the organization. 
The board also represents the different stakeholders, but here its membership is smaller, 
between 13 and 20, and its composition is not strictly proportionate to the general assembly 
(Melle, 1999). The board designates the executive director and has the power to fire him or 
her. It is also possible for the president to be the executive director. Table 1 shows the 
representation structure of the boards of directors of two important Spanish Cajas.  
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Table 1. Board representation  
 La Caixa2 Caja Madrid 
Representatives Num. Board Members Num. Board Members 
Public administrations (local and 
regional governments) 
4 (19%) 10 (47%) 
Representatives of depositors 8 (38%) 7 (33%) 
Founder entities 6 (28%) 0 (0%) 
Employees 3 (14%) 2 (9%) 
Representative entities  - 2 (9%) 
Total 21 (100%) 21 (100%) 
Source: Constructed using data from corporate information published on Cajas websites 
20103. 
 
 
Finally, the control commission has between 5 and 15 members and its role is to 
monitor the board and report to the central bank. In a nutshell, this structure of 
representation and control induces potential conflicts of interest among the myriad 
stakeholders who make up the governing bodies. Seen through the lens of agency theory, 
these institutions exemplify a serious governance challenge. The existence of multiple 
stakeholders with actual governing ‘voice’ may generate problems in deciding value-
maximizing strategies for the Cajas. It may also generate weak internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, poor monitoring and lack of systems to discipline management.  
 
III. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN 
SPANISH CAJAS 
The OECD (2005) defines banks with public participation by national and/or regional 
governments as state-owned banks –such as Spanish savings banks or Cajas. This 
                                           
2 La Caixa and Caja Madrid ranked as No. 56 and No. 98, respectively, in The Banker 2003 Top 1000 World Bank 
ranking. 
3 La Caixa http://portal.lacaixa.es/infocorporativa/gobiernocorporativo_es.html [Accessed 17th March 2011). 
Caja Madrid  
http://www.cajamadrid.com/CajaMadrid/Home/cruce/0,0,84630%24P1%3D401,00.html [Accessed 17th March 2011]. 
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participation is represented in the board of directors of the bank, and its ownership 
percentage can vary from a minority to more than the 50%, depending on the country 
(OECD, 2005; Ianotta et al., 2007).  In the Spanish case, there is as well a regulatory 
channel that regional governments may use to exert power over Cajas given that, from 
1985, the Spanish Constitutional Court recognized that the regulation of Cajas should be 
granted to regional governments (as part of the devolution process).  Figure 2 depicts the 
different paths regional governments may use to influence the governance of Cajas: either 
via regulation or through direct participation in governing bodies.  
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Figure 2. Cajas public corporate governance 
 
 
 
Given this regulatory framework, the risk of politicizing the governance of these entities 
has always been a source of conflict (Melle & Maroto, 1999; Azofra & Santamaría, 2002; 
La Porta et al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004; Fonseca, 2005). Each regional government has 
developed ad hoc regulatory solutions to preserve the control inside their territories – for 
example, the maximum age at which presidents can retire, or the veto power for approval of 
mergers.  Until July 2010, under Spanish legislation, regional governments could veto 
unwanted integrations.  
Moreover, regional governments may use the law to distribute the benefits to social 
and cultural projects in their region. Historically, Cajas have been perceived as an ally for 
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local development policies. It is often the case that key regional development projects are 
carried out with the financial support of the regional Caja (Melle & Maroto, 1999; Azofra 
& Santamaria, 2002; Fonseca, 2005). The interplay between social-economic and political 
interests is a lever for these types of project. Indeed, the territorial and identity component 
of the Cajas has always been an important factor in their social integration and economic 
success.  
Cajas have acted for the general interest benefit through complying with their social 
function: “Cajas benefits devoted to social goods and services in the regions has been a 
supporting feature of the Spanish welfare state” (General provisions of Cajas law, 
L11/2010). Currently, 88% Cajas have collaboration agreements with the public sector 
regarding welfare services (CECA, 2010). This mission has been channelled through the 
“Social and Cultural Welfare Project” (SCWP), which in 2009 invested €1.775 Mn (almost 
the same amount that Spain received in Structural Funds from the European Union: € 1.845 
Mn) –see Figure 3 for an evolution-.  
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Figure 3. Cajas funds initial provision to finance the “Social and Cultural Welfare 
Project” 
 
 
Source: CECA “Social and Cultural Welfare Project” reports 2000-2010. The Spanish 
Confederation of Savings Banks. 
 
The allocation of these resources is focussed in four main areas (2009): social welfare 
and healthcare (41%), culture and free time (33%), education and research (17%) and 
historic and natural heritage (9%) (CECA, 2009). It is noticeable the importance of the 
foundations that manage the SCWP inside Cajas. Two of them, La Caixa Foundation and 
Caja Madrid Foundation are 3rd and 6th among the top 50 European foundations by 
expenditure (Philantrophy, 2009). And they have to invest, by law, this SCWP in the 
regions where Cajas are based.  
In sum, Cajas, as state-owned banks, operate within a duality of objectives: on the 
one hand, it seeks profit maximization as any other commercial bank; but on the other 
hand, it provides financial support to economic and social activities in the region it operates 
(Apreda, 2006).  
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In the next section, we present the outcomes of the restructuring process due to the 
financial crisis. In order to do so, a process of data collection has been developed including 
the following sources: national regulation, regional regulations, orders of the central bank, 
policy makers public declarations for three years (President of Spain, ministry of economy, 
president of the central bank, presidents of regions and its ministers, European 
commissioners) and stakeholders (presidents from Cajas, Association of Cajas, unions, and 
think tanks).  
  
IV. THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING INDUSTRY  
Cajas have had an important role in the Spanish financial system. García-Cestona and 
Surroca (2008) state that “the market share of savings banks in 2004 was slightly higher 
than that of commercial banks: 48% vs. 47% in the loan market and 52% vs. 42% in the 
deposit market.” Since the 1990s, Cajas have experienced a dramatic expansion of 
branches as well as volume of assets. Moreover, they argue that the expansion out of the 
regions is associated with more aggressive growth in lending and reallocation within the 
loan portfolio. There has been a shift away from safer lending towards riskier commercial 
and mortgage lending. For instance, the share of real estate loans in the Cajas books in 
2006 has ranged from 10% to 50%. These percentages are extremely large considering that 
by the end of 2008, the volume of loans to real estate developers and builders reached 
almost €500 billion, equivalent to 50% of Spain’s GDP (Cuñat & Garicano, 2009). Indeed, 
this increase in debt in a sector with high default rates (around 5.05%) has generated 
severe solvency problems and prompted the current transformation of the Spanish banking 
sector.  
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In 2008 the central bank decided to recommend a reorganization of Cajas to ensure 
their financial survival. It demanded a reform focused on two areas. First, it advocated for 
a reorganization of those Cajas under the greatest economic stress, urging them to merge. 
Second, it attempted to reduce the power of the regional governments by requesting a 
reform of the Cajas law. The central bank’s plan was based on three ideas: 1) Cajas need 
to rationalize their resources; 2) this should be achieved via mergers between entities; and 
3) the adjustment should be completed by the summer of 2010 and, if needed, financial 
assistance would be provided by the central bank’s Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring 
(or FROB).  
The FROB is a public entity concerning bank restructuring and reinforcing the 
equity of credit entities. Access to FROB funds (with an initial allocation of € 9,000 Mn) is 
conditional on Cajas reorganizing their extensive branch networks and resizing via 
integration. One of the reasons behind the haste to use FROB (approved in July 2009) is 
that the European authorities have set a limit before they force its closure4. The European 
Commission  has established a calendar for fund duration since they consider that state aid 
damages competition and breaches the regulation of the interior market.  
As of December 2010, 40 Cajas out of a total of 45 had been involved in the 
restructuration of the sector  starting in 2008. Table 2 displays the 14 integration processes 
detailing the members of each case, the type of process, whether the integration is within 
or across regions and the level of funding support from FROB.  Nowadays, the number of 
Cajas has been reduced to 19 via several mechanism: mergers, Institutional Protection 
Schemes (IPS), or acquisitions. 
                                           
4 On January 2010, the European Comission approved the Spanish recapitalization scheme for banks aimed at enhancing 
the strength and solvency of credit institutions (State Aid N-28/2010). This scheme has been in place till December 2010. 
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Table 2. Map of integration processes of Spanish Cajas opened with the crisis 
 
Process  Savings banks involved Type Within/ or 
across 
regions 
Assets in € Mn Requested aid 
from FROB 
 (€ Mn) 
1 CATALUNYA CAIXA 
   Catalunya 
   Tarragona 
   Manresa 
Merger Within 76.649 1.250 
2 UNNIM 
   Sabadell 
   Terrassa 
   Manlleu 
Merger Within 28.548 380 
3 La Caixa 
Girona 
Merger Within 271.338 - 
4 Cajastur 
CCM 
Acquisition Across [View process 5] - 
5 BANCO BASE 
   CAM 
   Cajastur-CCM 
   Caja Cantabria 
   Extremadura 
IPS Across 125.562 1.493 
6 BANCO MARE NOSTRUM 
   Murcia 
   Penedes 
   Sa Nostra 
   Granada 
IPS Across 71.026 915 
7 Unicaja 
Jaen 
Merger Within 54.817 - 
8 BANCO CAJA 3 
   CAI 
   Circulo 
   Badajoz 
IPS Across 20.145 - 
9 BANCO FINANCIERO 
   Caja Madrid 
   Bancaja 
   Insular 
   Laietana 
   Avila 
   Segovia 
   Rioja 
IPS Across 334.508 4.465 
10 NOVA CAIXA GALICIA 
   Galicia 
   Caixanova 
Merger Within 75.549 1.162 
11 CAJA ESPAÑA-DUERO 
   Caja España 
   Caja Duero 
Merger Within 46.017 525 
12 BANCA CIVICA 
   Cajasol 
   Guadalajara 
   Navarra 
   Burgos 
   Canarias 
IPS Across 71.306 977 
13 Cajasur 
BBK  
Acquisition Across 47.000 - 
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14 BBK 
Kutxa 
Vital 
Merger 
(Failed, 
leaving door 
open for 
future 
process) 
Within 78.300 - 
Source: Constructed using data from FROB (2011) and economic media follow up. 
 
 
Three integration mechanisms have been used: in 15% of the cases an acquisition 
took place, in 46% of the cases were mergers and 39% were IPS. One innovation in the 
integration process is the use of a new restructuring formula: Institutional Protection 
Schemes (or IPS), also called virtual or cold integration. Integration under IPS allows 
entities to operate separately within their own territories, maintaining their own legal 
personality, commercial brand, governance systems, and regional commitment, but 
functioning as a single group regarding risk policies and management: credit risk, market 
risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and operational risk. Instead of creating one new entity 
from the union of others, a new, higher organizational entity -an umbrella- is formed. This 
formula allows operational integration in the form of shared services, technology and 
additional commercial networks. In these cases, the central bank must approve the project, 
and this requires the presentation of a viability plan, including synergies and cost 
reductions. Although the central bank prefers mergers to IPS, it recognizes that this channel 
allows for some cost saving, though it does not eliminate duplication of management and 
governance systems.   
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V.  DOES MULTI LEVEL GOVERNANCE CONFLICT MATTER? OUTCOME OF 
THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE SPANISH BANKING SYSTEM 
So far we have provided evidence for multilevel governance in Cajas and we have 
presented the mapping of the restructuring process. In this section we examine the variables 
driving each type of restructuring process and the role of multilevel governance in 
determining the final outcome.  
The hot political and economic debate on the integration process has been between 
two arguments that refer to the duality of Cajas’ mission: first, gaining efficiency to deal 
with the solvency problems and second, keeping their “Social and Cultural Welfare 
Project” (SCWP, or “Obra social” in Spanish). Table 3 presents the key motivations and 
sources of power by the different decision makers involved in the restructuring process. 
The national government main goals have been to push for efficiency gains and a less 
politicized financial sector. It has used regulation at the national level as a means to achieve 
it – for example, in July 2010 a new regulation was passed that limited the voting rights of 
the regional and local governments from 50% to 40%, and required that a third of the board 
members of the resulting financial entities to be independent. In contrast, regional 
governments aim to maintain the economic involvement of Cajas in their regional areas 
and to maximize the investment in SCWP. Their sources of power are veto power, 
regulation and voting rights at the governing boards. 
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Table 3. Decision makers’ goals in integration process 
Decision maker Goals Sources of power 
National government  
 
 
 Gaining efficiency to 
access markets 
 A non politicized 
financial map 
 
 National regulation 
 Economic policy 
 Alignment with central 
bank 
Central bank  Fund for Orderly Bank 
Restructuring (FROB) 
 Orders5 
 Autonomy from the 
national government 
(credible voice) 
Regional governments  Maximization of the 
Social and Cultural 
Welfare Project (SCWP) 
as co-builder of the 
regions welfare state 
 Regional development: 
Cajas as bond buyers, 
credit givers and 
investors 
 Founder members of 
Cajas  
 Corporate management 
voting rights  
 Regional regulation –
devolution rights-  
 Veto power on alliances 
 
How have the different motivations stemming from multilevel governance affected 
the outcomes of the restructuring process? We investigate whether the alliances are 
following a geographic proximity (within region alliances, or neighbouring regions), 
political proximity (the same party in the regional government) or business efficiency and 
diversification (out-of-region integrations). The response to the call for the integration of 
Cajas has been to use criteria of geographical (same region) and political proximity, giving 
way to a third alternative when the former is not applicable (see Table 4).  
                                           
5 I.e. the central bank can impose restrictions on Cajas’ SCWP (since Feb 2011) to strength their reserves. 
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Table 4. Drivers of restructuring processes  
Proximity 
Political 
Same political party 
in gov’t 
Different political 
parties in gov’t 
Geographical  
Same 
region 
MERGERS - 
Out of 
region 
ACQUISITIONS 
INSTITUTIONAL 
PROTECTION 
SCHEMES 
 
 
From the 13 integration processes outlined in Table 2 (the failed process is out of 
the analysis), we find all the cases of mergers took place within the same region. None of 
the 13 integration processes took place among neighbouring regions. That is, either we find 
mergers within the same region or IPS across regions.  In the case of the two acquisition 
processes we find that they are driven by political proximity since both regions are 
governed by the same party (PSOE). Moreover, we find that IPS are the preferred option 
when Cajas need to integrate beyond regional borders and there is no political proximity 
among the participating regions.  
Initially, in late 2008, most management teams of Spanish Cajas were negotiating 
merger plans that included entities in other regions. However, it is surprising to see that, as 
of December 2010, 46% percent of the integrations occur between Cajas within the same 
region. This result fits the main goal of regional governments, that is, to keep Cajas as 
partners in their economic policies for regional development6. For mergers across different 
regional areas, Institutional Protections Schemes (IPS) have been the solution: a virtual 
integration across different territories with different clients profiles and risk diversification. 
                                           
6 The regional presidents themselves were making those claims. And Cajas presidents were informing about these political 
interferences in the process.  
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Through the IPS a certain level of influence is kept in Cajas’ original regional territories, 
while following the central bank goal for efficiency.  
Further analysis on IPS offers information regarding which kind of saving banks are 
clustering together. Historically, Cajas in Spain have been considered with a more or less 
public status depending on the percentatge of public sector participation in their governing 
bodies. Using a well established classification by Fonseca (2005) we map the level of 
public sector representation for each integration process in Figure 4.   
Figure 4. Public cajas and IPS 
 
Source: Constructed based on the classification of public Cajas by Fonseca (2005) and 
FROB (2011). 
 
The vertical axis in Figure 4 represents the median of the percentage of public sector 
representation at the board of each participating Caja.  We use this measure as a proxy for 
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the political influence regarding the decision making in the Cajas. In the horizontal axis, 
each number corresponds to a restructuring process, in same order as Table 2. We find that  
mergers are associated with Cajas with less public representation in their boards; while 
most IPS are bringing together Cajas that traditionally have had a more public status.  
This result fits with the framework provided in Figure 2 on the two main channels 
that regional government may use to exert influence. In sum, since all mergers cases have 
remained in the same region, regional governments will continue to use regulation as the 
main vehicle to exert influence. In contrast, for IPS cases across regions, it is necessary for 
the different regional governments to have direct representation in the governing boards.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FOR POLICY MAKERS  
Since July 2008, the Spanish banking sector has gone through a major reorganization of its 
State-owned Savings banks or Cajas —which represent half of the financial sector. These 
entities have a public status since both local and regional governments have historically 
been important stakeholders and have voting rights in their governing bodies. Given the 
public nature of Cajas, the central bank of Spain and the national government have 
additional roles as regulators and monitors of these institutions. The much needed 
reorganization of the sector has evidenced the contrasting goals and conflict of interest 
among the different governments. The objective of the paper has been to examine how this 
multilevel governance frame plays a role in determining the outcome of the current 
financial reorganization.  
The first contribution of the paper is to provide a framework for Public Corporate 
Governance. Figure 2 highlights the two main components: first, the traditional corporate 
governance mechanisms (via governing bodies and voting rights) and, second, the 
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multilevel governance across public sector institutions that exert influence via regulation 
and monitoring.   
With this framework in hand, we describe the different goals and sources of power 
among the three main players in the reorganization process: the regional governments, the 
national government and the central bank. We provide evidence for the conflict in 
multilevel governance which revolve around two main goals: either aiming for efficiency 
gains and to reconvert Cajas into non-politicized financial entities, or aiming for the 
maximization of Social and Cultural Welfare Projects within the regions. 
Next, we provide a general picture of the reorganization of the Spanish banking 
system: from the initial 45 Cajas, there have been 14 integration processes resulting into 19 
new financial entities. Three integration mechanisms have been used: in 15% of the cases 
an acquisition took place, in 46% of the cases were mergers and 39% were IPS.  
It is striking to find that all mergers are within region and all IPS across regions; the 
acquisitions cases respond to political proximity. Regional governments have been using 
their sources of power within region (regulatory power and, most importantly, veto power) 
to defend that mergers occur among Cajas sitting inside their areas of regional influence. 
When the mergers within regions have not been deemed possible, the option of the IPS or 
vitual merger has become the alternative. In the IPS cases, the channel to continue to exert 
influence in the new financial entity is via boardroom representation -since the regulation 
channel does not apply anymore. We find that IPS across regions take place among Cajas 
with high level of public representation in boards prior to the integration. This may induce 
similar levels of public representation in the new governing bodies of the resulting Cajas.  
In sum, regional governments are using different strategies to influence the 
governance of the resulting Cajas: either via regulation in the cases of mergers within-
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region or through direct participation in governing bodies in the cases of IPS. The case of 
the reorganization of the Spanish financial sector is an example of Public Corporate 
Governance at work – where it is necessary to include the multilevel governance of public 
sector institutions to the standard corporate governance mechanisms. 
 Finally, the case of the restructuring of the Spanish banking system may have 
relevant policy implications for policy makers in other countries with state-owned banks – 
government ownership of banks is a phenomenon that affects at least 80 countries around 
the world (La Porta et al., 2002). In such countries, the multilevel governance issues that 
have arise in the Spanish case should give guidance regarding the divergence of interests 
among the different levels of public administration players. For instance, in our case, the 
Spanish government tried to spur the integration process via national regulation and it did 
not progress successfully given the veto power of the regional governments. Hence, policy 
makers should foresee the tension between goals and implementation mechanisms – i.e. the 
IPS formula, together with the FROB funding and the oversight of the central bank have 
managed to reach the desired integration outcome while encompassing the interests of all 
the involved parties.  
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